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Abstract
Upstream reciprocity (also called generalized reciprocity) is a putative mechanism for cooperation in
social dilemma situations with which players help others when they are helped by somebody else. It
is a type of indirect reciprocity. Although upstream reciprocity is often observed in experiments, most
theories suggest that it is operative only when players form short cycles such as triangles, implying a small
population size, or when it is combined with other mechanisms that promote cooperation on their own.
An expectation is that real social networks, which are known to be full of triangles and other short cycles,
may accommodate upstream reciprocity. In this study, I extend the upstream reciprocity game proposed
for a directed cycle by Boyd and Richerson to the case of general networks. The model is not evolutionary
and concerns the conditions under which the unanimity of cooperative players is a Nash equilibrium. I
show that an abundance of triangles or other short cycles in a network does little to promote upstream
reciprocity. Cooperation is less likely for a larger population size even if triangles are abundant in the
network. In addition, in contrast to the results for evolutionary social dilemma games on networks,
scale-free networks lead to less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous degree distribution.
Introduction
Several mechanisms govern cooperation among individuals in social dilemma situations such as the pris-
oner’s dilemma game. Upstream reciprocity, also called generalized reciprocity, is one such mechanism
in which players help others when they themselves are helped by other players. It is a form of indirect
reciprocity, in which individuals are helped by unknown others and vice versa [1, 2].
2Cooperation based on upstream reciprocity has been observed in various laboratory experiments.
Examples include human subjects in variants of the trust game, which is a social dilemma game [3–5],
human subjects participating in filling out tedious surveys [6], and rats pulling a lever to deliver food to
a conspecific [7]. Even more experimental evidence is available in the field of sociology in the context of
social exchange [8, 9] (also see [10, 11] for classical examples of the Kula ring).
Nevertheless, theory and numerical simulations have revealed that upstream reciprocity in isolation
does not promote cooperation (but see Barta et al. [12] for an exception). Upstream reciprocity usually
supports cooperation only when combined with another mechanism that can yield cooperation on its own.
Cooperation appears when the population size is small [13, 14], upstream reciprocity is combined with
direct reciprocity or spatial reciprocity [15], players move across groups [16], players interact assortatively
[17], or players inhabit heterogeneous networks [18].
In their seminal study, Boyd and Richerson analyzed an upstream reciprocity game on a directed
cycle and showed that it yields cooperation only when the cycle is small [13]. The shortest possible cycle
with indirect reciprocity consists of three players (Fig. 1) because a cycle composed of two players only
involves direct reciprocity. Cooperation is intuitively less likely for longer cycles because a player that
helps a unique downstream neighbor on the cycle has to “trust” too many intermediary players for their
tendency to cooperate before the player eventually receives help.
Real social networks are full of short cycles represented by triangles, a feature known as transitivity [19]
or clustering [20–22]. Therefore, a natural expectation is that larger networks with a high level of
clustering (i.e., many triangles) may facilitate cooperation based on upstream reciprocity [8]. In the
present study, I address this issue theoretically. I extend the model of Boyd and Richerson [13] to general
networks and derive the condition under which the unanimity of players using upstream reciprocity is
resistant to invasion of defectors. Then, I apply the condition to model networks to show that clustering
does little to promote cooperation except in an unrealistic network. This conclusion holds true for both
homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, where heterogeneity concerns that in the degree, i.e., the
number of neighbors for a player.
My results seem to contradict previous results for spatial reciprocity in which clustering enhances
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game [23] and those for heterogeneous networks in which hetero-
geneity enhances cooperation in various two-person social dilemma games [24–27] and in the upstream
reciprocity game [18]. These previous models are evolutionary, however, whereas mine and the original
3model by Boyd and Richerson [13] are nonevolutionary and based on the Nash equilibrium. I opted to
use a nonevolutionary setting in this study because interpretation of evolutionary games seems elusive
for heterogeneous networks [28, 29] (see Discussion for a more detailed explanation).
Results
Preliminary: upstream reciprocity on a directed cycle
Boyd and Richerson proposed a model of upstream reciprocity on the directed cycle [13]. By analyzing
the stability of a unanimous population of cooperative players, they showed that cooperation is unlikely
unless the number of players, denoted by N , is small.
In their model, the players are involved in a type of donation game. Each player may donate to a
unique downstream neighbor on a directed cycle at time t = 0 by paying cost c(> 0). The recipient of
the donation gains benefit b(> c). Among the recipients of the donation at t = 0, those who comply
with upstream reciprocity donate to a unique downstream neighbor at t = 1 by paying cost c. Chains of
donation are then carried over to downstream players, who may donate to their downstream neighbors at
t = 2. At t = 1, defectors that have received a donation at t = 0 terminate the chain of donation. Such
defectors receive benefit b at t = 0 and lose nothing at t = 1. This procedure is repeated for all players
until all the chains of donation terminate. If all the players perfectly comply with upstream reciprocity,
the chains never terminate. In contrast, if there is at least one defector, all the chains terminate in finite
time.
As in iterated games [30,31], w (0 ≤ w < 1) is the probability that the next time step occurs. We can
also interpret w as the probability that players complying with upstream reciprocity do donate to their
downstream neighbors, such that they erroneously defect with probability 1−w in each time step. Each
player’s payoff is defined as the discounted sum of the payoff over the time horizon. In other words, the
payoff obtained at time t (≥ 0) contributes to the summed payoff with weight wt.
It may be advantageous for a player not to donate to the downstream neighbor to gain benefit b
without paying cost c over the time course. However, a player that complies with upstream reciprocity
may enjoy a large summed payoff if chains of donation persist in the network for a long time.
Each player is assumed to be of either classical defector (CD; termed unconditional defection in [13])
or generous cooperator (GC; termed upstream tit-for-tat in [13]). By definition, a CD does not donate to
4the downstream neighbor at t = 0 and refuses to relay the chain of donation received from the upstream
neighbor to the downstream neighbor at t ≥ 1. A GC donates at t = 0 and donates to the downstream
neighbor if the GC received a donation from the upstream neighbor in the previous time step.
For this model, Boyd and Richerson obtained the condition under which the unanimity of GCs is
robust against the invasion of a CD (i.e., conversion of one GC into CD). When all players are GC, the
summed payoff to one GC is equal to
(b− c)(1 + w + w2 + . . .) =
b− c
1− w
. (1)
If N − 1 players are GC and one player is CD, the unique CD’s summed payoff is given by
b(1 + w + w2 + . . .+ wN−1) =
b(1− wN−1)
1− w
. (2)
Therefore, GC is stable against the invasion of CD if the right-hand side of Eq. (1) is larger than that of
Eq. (2), that is,
wN−1 >
c
b
. (3)
Equation (3) generalizes the result for direct reciprocity [30, 31], which corresponds to the case where
N = 2. Equation (3) also implies that cooperation is likely if w is large. However, maintaining cooperation
is increasingly difficult as N increases.
Model
I generalize the Boyd-Richerson model on a directed cycle to the case of general networks. Consider a
network of N players in which links may be directed or weighted. I denote the weight of the link from
player i to j by Aij ≥ 0. I assume that the network is strongly connected, i.e., any player is reacheable
from any other player along directed links. Otherwise, chains of donation starting from some playes never
return to them because of the purely structural reason. In such a network, it would be more difficult to
maintain cooperation than in strongly connected networks. Even for strongly connected networks that
might accommodate upstream reciprocity, I will show that cooperation is not likely for realistic network
structure.
Assume that all the players are GC and that each GC starts a chain of donation of unit size at t = −∞.
5Therefore, the total amount of donation flowing in the network in each time step is equal to N . In the
steady state, the total amount of donation that each player receives from upstream neighbors is equal to
that each player gives to downstream neighbors in each time step. I denote the total amount of donation
that reaches and leaves player i by Nvi, where
∑N
i=1 vi = 1. In this situation, the amount of donation
that player i imparts to player j in each time step is equal to NviAij/k
out
i , where k
out
i ≡
∑N
ℓ=1Aiℓ is the
outdegree of player i. Player i receives payoff (b− c)Nvi in each time step.
In our previous work [18], we assumed that each GC starts a unit flow of donation at t = 0. In the
present study, however, I wait until the flow reaches the steady state before starting the game at t = 0.
The definition of CD for general networks is straightforward; a CD donates to nobody for t ≥ 0. I
extend the concept of GC to the case of general networks as follows. On a directed cycle, a GC quits
helping its downstream neighbor once the GC is not helped by the upstream neighbor [13]. On a general
network, the total amount of donation that GC i receives per unit time in the absence of a CD is equal
to Nvi =
∑N
ℓ=1NvℓAℓi/k
out
ℓ . If there is a CD, the total amount of donation that GC i receives may
be smaller than the amount that player i would receive in the absence of a CD. By definition, the GC
responds to this situation by relaying the total amount of the incoming donation proportionally to all its
downstream neighbors in accordance with the weights of the links outgoing from player i.
As an example, suppose that one upstream neighbor of GC i, denoted by j, is CD and all the other
N − 1 players, including player i, are GC. At t = 0, the total amount of donation that i receives is
equal to
∑N
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j NvℓAℓi/k
out
ℓ , which is smaller than Nvi. Player i donates Nvi in total. Therefore,
player i’s payoff at t = 0 is equal to b
∑N
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j NvℓAℓi/k
out
ℓ − cNvi. In response to the amount of
donation that player i received at t = 0, player i adjusts the total amount of donation that it gives
the downstream neighbors from Nvi to
∑N
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j NvℓAℓi/k
out
ℓ at t = 1. Therefore, player i donates∑N
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j(NvℓAℓi/k
out
ℓ ) × (Aij′/k
out
i ) to its downstream neighbor j
′. This quantity is smaller than the
donation that player i would give player j′ in the absence of CD j, which would be equal to NviAij′/k
out
i .
An implicit assumption is that the GC cannot identify the incoming links along which less donation
is received as compared to the case without a CD. In other words, even if a GC is defected by the CD in
the upstream, the GC cannot directly retaliate. Instead, the GC distributes the retaliation equally (i.e.,
proportionally to the weight of the link) to its downstream neighbors.
6Stability of upstream reciprocity in networks
In this section, I derive the condition under which no player is motivated to convert from GC to CD
when all the players are initially GC.
The steady state v = (v1 . . . vN ) is equivalent to the stationary density of the simple random walk
in discrete time. It is given as the solution of
v = vD−1A, (4)
where A = (Aij) is the N -by-N adjacency matrix, where Aij represents the weight of the link from i to
j, and the diagonal matrix D is defined as D = diag(kout1 , . . . , k
out
N ). The (i, j) element of D
−1A is equal
to Aij/k
out
i , that is, the probability that a walker at node i transits to node j in one time step. If the
network is undirected, the solution of Eq. (4) is given by vi = ki/
∑N
ℓ=1 kℓ, where ki = k
out
i =
∑N
ℓ=1Aiℓ =∑N
ℓ=1Aℓi.
The summed payoff to player i is equal to
∞∑
t=0
(b − c)wtNvi =
(b− c)Nvi
1− w
. (5)
To examine the Nash stability of the unanimity of GC, I analyze the situation in which player i is
CD and the other N − 1 players are GC. At t = 0, the N − 1 GCs pay cNvj (j 6= i), and player i pays
nothing. Therefore, the benefits to the N players, including player i, at t = 0 are given in vector form by
bNv(I − Ei)D
−1A, (6)
where I is the N -by-N identity matrix, and Ei is the N -by-N matrix whose (i, i) element is equal to one
and all the other elements are equal to zero. The benefit to player j (1 ≤ j ≤ N) at t = 0 is equal to the
jth element of the row vector given by Eq. (6).
At t = 1, the downstream neighbors of player i donate less because player i defects at t = 0. The
amount of donation given to player j, where j is not necessarily a neighbor of i, at t = 0 is equal to the
jth element of the row vector Nv(I − Ei)D
−1A. Therefore, the total amount that GC j(6= i) donates
to its downstream neighbors at t = 1 is equal to the jth element of Nv(I − Ei)D
−1A. Player i, who is
CD, does not donate to others at t = 1. Therefore, the amount of the donation issued by the players at
7t = 1 is represented in vector form as Nv(I−Ei)D
−1A(I −Ei). The discounted benefits that the players
receive at t = 1 are given in vector form by
wbNv
[
(I − Ei)D
−1A
]2
. (7)
By repeating the same procedure, we can obtain the summed benefits to the players in vector form as
bNv
∞∑
t=0
wt
[
(I − Ei)D
−1A
]t+1
= bNv(I − Ei)D
−1A
[
I − w(I − Ei)D
−1A
]−1
. (8)
To derive Eq. (8), I used the fact that the spectral radius of w(I − Ei)D
−1A is smaller than unity (that
of D−1A is equal to unity). The ith element of Eq. (8) is equal to the summed payoff to player i because
player i does not pay the cost to donate at any t.
If the ith element of Eq. (8) is smaller than the quantity given by Eq. (5), player i is not motivated
to turn from GC to CD. Therefore, the unanimity of GC is stable if and only if
bNv(I − Ei)D
−1A
[
I − w(I − Ei)D
−1A
]−1 ∣∣∣∣
i
<
(b− c)Nvi
1− w
(1 ≤ i ≤ N), (9)
where |i indicates the ith element of a vector. By rearranging terms of Eq. (9), I obtain
v
[
I − (I − Ei)D
−1A
]
·
[
I − w(I − Ei)D
−1A
]−1 ∣∣∣∣
i
>
c
b
vi (1 ≤ i ≤ N). (10)
Because vD−1A = v, Eq. (10) can be reduced to
(
Ai1
ki
· · ·
AiN
ki
)[
I − w(I − Ei)D
−1A
]−1 ∣∣∣∣
i
>
c
b
(1 ≤ i ≤ N). (11)
Equation (11) is never satisfied when w = 0 because Aii = 0. It is always satisfied when w ≈ 1
because the left-hand side of Eq. (10) tends to vi as w → 1.
For a directed cycle having N nodes, v = (1 . . . 1)/N , kouti = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ N), and Aij is equal to 1 if
(i+1) mod N = j and 0 otherwise. Owing to the symmetry with respect to i, we only have to consider
8the condition (i.e., Eq. (9) or Eq. (11)) for player 1 and obtain the following:
v(I − Ei)D
−1A =
1
N
(1 0 1 . . . 1), (12)
v
[
(I − Ei)D
−1A
]2
=
1
N
(1 0 0 1 . . . 1), (13)
v
[
(I − Ei)D
−1A
]N−1
=
1
N
(1 0 . . . 0), (14)
v
[
(I − Ei)D
−1A
]N
=(0 . . . 0). (15)
Therefore, Eq. (11) can be read as wN−1 > c/b, which reproduces the result by Boyd and Richerson [13].
Numerical results for various networks
For general networks, calculating
[
I − w(I − Ei)D
−1A
]−1
, which is used in Eqs. (9) and (11), is techni-
cally difficult because this matrix may have nondiagonal Jordan blocks. Standard formulae for decompos-
ing matrices under independence of different eigenmodes do not simply apply. The method for efficiently
calculating
[
I − w(I − Ei)D
−1A
]−1
is described in the Methods section.
I conducted numerical simulations for different networks to determine the threshold value of w, denoted
by wth, above which the unanimity of GC is stable against invasion of CD. The conclusions derived from
the following numerical simulations are summarized as follows: (a) abundance of triangles (and other
short cycles) hardly promotes cooperation, and (b) networks with heterogeneous degree distributions
yield less cooperation than those with homogeneous degree distributions.
Network models
I use five types of undirected networks generated from four network models. It would be even more
difficult to obtain cooperation in directed networks because undirected networks generally allow more
direct reciprocity than directed networks (see Discussion for a more detailed explanation).
The regular random graph (RRG) is defined as a completely randomly wired network under the
restriction that all nodes (i.e., players) have the same degree k [21,22]. The RRG has low clustering (i.e.,
low triangle density) and is homogeneous in degree [21, 22, 32].
To construct a network from the Watts-Strogatz (WS) model [32], nodes are placed in a circle and
connected such that each one is adjacent to the k/2 closest nodes on each side on the circle. In this way,
9each node has degree k. A fraction p of the links is then rewired, and a selected link preserves one of its
end nodes and abandons the other end node. Then, I randomly select a node from the network as the
new destination of the rewired link such that self-loops and multiple links are avoided. I use two cases,
one in which p = 0 and the other in which p is small but greater than zero. In both cases, the network
has a high amount of clustering. When p = 0, the network is homogeneous in degree and unrealistic
because it has a large average distance between nodes. When p is positive and appropriately small, the
degree is narrowly distributed and the network has a small average distance [32].
As an example of networks with heterogeneous degree distribution, I use the Baraba´si-Albert (BA)
model. It has a power-law (scale-free) degree distribution p(k) ∝ k−3, a small average distance, and low
level of clustering [20, 33].
To probe the effect of triangles in scale-free networks, I use a variant of the Klemm-Egu´ıluz (KE)
model [34, 35]. For appropriate parameter values, my variant of the KE model generates scale-free
networks with p(k) ∝ k−3, small average distances, and a high level of clustering.
The effect of clustering
For a fixed network and a fixed value of cost-to-benefit ratio c/b, the threshold value of w above which
the unanimity of GC is stable against conversion of player i into CD depends on i. I denote this value
by wth(i). I determine wth as the largest value of wth(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ N). This is true because once a certain
player i turns from GC to CD, other players may be also inclined to turn to CD. It is straightforward to
extend the condition shown in Eq. (9) to the case of multiple CD players. For example, we can similarly
derive the condition under which player j turns from GC to CD when player i (6= j) is CD and all
the other N − 2 players are GC. For example, on the left-hand side of Eq. (9), we just need to replace
Ei with Ei + Ej . I confirmed for all the following numerical results that once a player turns from GC
to CD, some others are also elicited to turn from GC to CD according to the Nash criterion and that
such a transition from GC to CD cascades until all players are CD. In loose terms, this phenomenon is
reminiscent of models of cascading failure of overloaded networks, which mimic, for example, blackouts
on power grids [36].
The relationship between wth and c/b is shown in Fig. 2(a) for the five networks with N = 20 and
mean degree k = 4. The parameter values for the networks are explained in the caption of Fig. 2. A
small c/b value results in a small wth value, indicating that cooperation is facilitated. This is generally
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the case for various mechanisms for cooperation [2, 37].
For reference, the results for direct reciprocity (wth = c/b) and upstream reciprocity on the directed
triangle (Fig. 1; wth =
√
c/b) are also shown in Fig. 2(a) by thin black lines. Except for small c/b values,
the five networks with N = 20 possess higher wth values as compared to these reference cases.
The two networks generated from the WS model yield smaller values of wth than those obtained from
the RRG, indicating that the WS model allows more cooperation than the RRG. Because the degree
distributions of these networks are almost the same and the average distances of the RRG and the WS
model with p = 0.1 do not differ by much [32], I ascribe this difference to clustering. An abundance of
triangles and short cycles in networks (i.e., the WS model) enhances cooperation. However, the difference
in wth is not very large. In quantitative terms, clustering does little to promote cooperation.
The same conclusion is supported for heterogeneous networks (the BA and KE models). Values of
wth for the KE model, which yields a high level of clustering are smaller than those for the BA model,
which yields a low level of clustering. However, the wth values for the KE model are considerably larger
than those for the RRG and the WS model, and the differences between the results for the BA and KE
models are small.
To summarize, clustering promotes cooperation but only to a small extent. To further substantiate
this finding, I looked at different cases. Figure 2(b) compares wth and c/b values for the networks with
N = 200 and k = 6. Figure 3(a) shows the dependence of wth on N when c/b = 1/3. These cases also
suggest that clustering hardly promotes cooperation.
Scale-free versus homogeneous networks
Figure 2 indicates that scale-free networks (i.e., the BA and KE models) allow less cooperation than
networks with a homogeneous degree distribution (i.e., the RRG and WS model). This is in contrast
with the results for the evolutionary two-person social dilemma games [24–27] and those for the evolu-
tionary upstream reciprocity game [18] on heterogeneous networks in which scale-free networks promote
cooperation. The difference stems from the fact that players in evolutionary games mimic successful
neighbors, whereas in my Nash equilibrium model, players judge whether GC or CD is more profitable
when the other players do not change the strategies (see Discussion for a more detailed explanation).
To probe the reason why cooperation is reduced on scale-free networks, I examine the dependence of
the player-wise threshold value, i.e., wth(i) for player i, on node degree ki. I generate a single network
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from each of the RRG, the BA model, and the KE model with N = 200 using the same parameter values
as those used in Fig. 2(b). For c/b = 1/3, the relationship between wth(i) and ki is shown in Fig. 4 for
all nodes in the three networks. wth(i) decreases with ki in the BA and KE models. In the RRG, ki is
equal to 6 for all the nodes, and the value of wth(i) is approximately the same for all the nodes.
wth(i) and ki are negatively correlated because the amount of donation flow that a putative CD i
stops is strongly correlated with vi. At t = 0, it is equal to vi. At t ≥ 1, it is generally smaller than vi,
but player i having a large vi value tends to receive a large inflow of donation, which player i stops in the
next time step. For undirected networks, vi = ki/
∑N
ℓ=1 kℓ ∝ ki holds true. Players with small degrees
are therefore tempted to convert to CD because the impact of the player’s behavior (i.e., to donate or not
to donate) on the entire network is small. Therefore, a small ki leads to a large wth(i). Even for directed
networks, vi and k
out
i are often strongly correlated [38–40]. Because the minimum degree in a scale-free
network is smaller than that in a homogeneous network if the mean degree of the two networks is equal,
scale-free networks have larger wth as compared to homogeneous networks.
Cooperation in large networks
A comparison of Figs. 2(a) and 2(b) suggests that a large N makes cooperation unlikely. To examine
this point further, I set c/b = 1/3, generated 100 networks for each N value and each network type,
calculated wth, and obtained the mean and the standard deviation of wth. Because the WS model with
p = 0 is unique for a given N , the mean and standard deviation are not relevant in this network.
The mean and standard deviation of wth for the five networks of various sizes are shown in Fig. 3(a).
The results for the BA and KE models heavily overlap. Cooperation is less likely as N increases in all
models, except for the WS model with p = 0. This result is consistent with that for a directed cycle [13].
wth increases with N not entirely owing to the decreased level of clustering in the network. To show
this, I plot the mean and standard deviation of the clustering coefficient C(∈ [0, 1]), which quantifies
the abundance of triangles in a network [32], in Fig. 3(b). The clustering coefficient is defined as C ≡
(1/N)×
∑N
i=1(number of triangles including node i)/[ki(ki−1)/2]. Figure 3(b) indicates that C decreases
with N for the RRG and the BA model. Therefore, the effect of N and C on wth may be mixed in these
two network models. However, C stays almost constant for the WS and KE models. At least for these
models, an increase in wth is considered to originate primarily from an increase in N , not from changes
in the level of clustering.
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In Fig. 3(a), wth seems to approach unity as N increases except for the WS model with p = 0. As
previously stated, the WS model with p = 0 is unrealistic because it has a large average distance between
pairs of nodes [20–22, 32]. Therefore, I conclude that cooperation based on upstream reciprocity is not
likely for homogeneous and heterogeneous networks in general.
Discussion
I generalized the upstream reciprocity model proposed for a directed cycle [13] to general networks and
reached two primary conclusions.
First, cooperation based on upstream reciprocity is not likely in general networks regardless of the
abundance of triangles and heterogeneity in the node degree. Because the networks that I examined
are undirected, some amount of direct reciprocity is relevant; GC neighbors partially retaliate directly
against a CD. My result that cooperation is unlikely for undirected networks implies that cooperation
would be even more difficult for directed networks in which direct reciprocity is less available. In directed
networks, direct reciprocity occurs only on reciprocal links between a pair of players.
Second, I showed that scale-free network models allow less cooperation (i.e., large wth) as compared
to networks with homogeneous degree distributions. This result is opposite of those for two-person social
dilemma games [24–27] and the upstream reciprocity game [18]. The difference stems from the fact that
the previous studies assumed evolutionary games and the present study (and the original model by Boyd
and Richerson [13]) is based on nonevolutionary analysis.
I adopted a nonevolutionary setup and examined the condition for the Nash equilibrium because
the concept of the evolutionary game on heterogeneous networks seems elusive. Evolutionary games on
heterogeneous networks imply that a player imitates the strategy of a successful neighbor that is likely to
have a different node degree. However, players with different degrees are involved in essentially different
games because the number of times that each player plays the game per generation necessarily depends
on the degree. Therefore, for example, a small-degree player cannot generally expect a large payoff by
mimicking a successful neighbor with a large degree. In this situation, defining the game and payoff for
players with various degrees is complicated [26,28,29]. Use of the Nash criterion does not incur this type
of problem.
The overall conclusions of the present study are negative. To explain the occurrence of upstream
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reciprocity in real societies, it may be advantageous to combine upstream reciprocity with other non-
network mechanisms, such as the ones mentioned in the Introduction.
Methods
Numerical methods for calculating Eqs. (9) and (11)
I determined wth by applying the bisection method to Eq. (9) or (11). To calculate
[
I − w(I − Ei)D
−1A
]−1
for different values of w, it is beneficial to use the expansion of (I − Ei)D
−1A in terms of independent
modes. This is possible when the adjacency matrix A for the subnetwork composed of the GCs is diago-
nalizable, as shown below.
I assume that there are Ns ≡ N − Nd GCs and Nd CDs. In the main text, I focused on the case
Nd = 1. However, the case Nd ≥ 2 is also relevant because I verified in the main text that the appearance
of a single CD leads to the further emergence of CDs. Without loss of generality, I assume that players 1,
2, . . . , Ns are GC and players Ns+1, Ns+2, . . ., N are CD, and that the network is strongly connected.
We need to identify all the (generalized) eigenmodes of EsD
−1A, where
Es ≡
Ns∑
i=1
Ei. (16)
I first partition Es, D
−1, and A into two-by-two blocks, each partition corresponding to the set of GC
and that of CD. For a candidate of a left eigenvector of EsD
−1A, denoted by v(i),
v
(i)EsD
−1A ≡
(
v
(i)
s v
(i)
d
)INs O
O O



D−1s O
O D−1d



Ass Asd
Ads Add


=
(
v
(i)
s D−1s Ass v
(i)
s D−1s Asd
)
, (17)
where INs is the identity matrix of size Ns; Ds and Dd are diagonal matrices whose diagonal entries are
equal to the outdegrees of the GCs and CDs, respectively; Ass is the Ns-by-Ns matrix corresponding to
the adjacent matrix within the GCs; and Asd, Ads, and Add are similarly defined blocks of the original
adjacency matrix A. Note that Ads and Add are absent on the right-hand side of Eq. (17) and as such
are not relevant to the following discussion.
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First of all, v(i) = (v
(i)
s v
(i)
d ) = e
⊤
i (Ns + 1 ≤ i ≤ N) is a trivial zero left eigenvector of EsD
−1A.
Here, ⊤ denotes transpose, and ei is the unit column vector in which the ith element is equal to unity
and all the other elements are equal to zero.
To obtain the other Ns generalized eigenmodes of EsD
−1A, I consider the case in which D−1s Ass is
diagonalizable. Otherwise, efficiently calculating
[
I − wEsD
−1A
]−1
via matrix decomposition is difficult.
D−1s Ass is diagonalizable if the network is undirected. A diagonalizable D
−1
s Ass possesses Ns nondegen-
erate left eigenvector v
(i)
s (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns) with the corresponding eigenvalue λi. It is possible that λi = λj
for i 6= j.
If λi 6= 0, λi is an eigenvalue of EsD
−1A, and the corresponding left eigenvector is given by v(i) =
(v
(i)
s v
(i)
d ), where
v
(i)
d =
v
(i)
s D−1s Asd
λi
. (18)
If λi = 0, Eq. (17) implies that v
(i) = (v
(i)
s v
(i)
d ) is not a left eigenvector of EsD
−1A. An example
network with N = 3 that has nontrivial zero eigenvalues is presented in the next section for a pedagogical
purpose. When λi = 0, I set v
(i)
d = 0 such that
v
(i)EsD
−1A = ( 0︸︷︷︸
Ns zeros
v
(i)
s D
−1
d Asd︸ ︷︷ ︸
of size Nd
). (19)
Because (0 v
(i)
s D
−1
d Asd) can be represented as a linear sum of e
⊤
i (Ns + 1 ≤ i ≤ N), v
(i) is a type of
generalized eigenvector corresponding to λi = 0.
I denote by u(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns) the nontrivial generalized right eigenmodes of EsD
−1A corresponding
to v(i). To obtain u(i), I denote by u
(i)
s (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns) the normalized right eigenvectors of D
−1
s Ass with
eigenvalue λi. Then,
u
(i) ≡


u
(i)
s
0


}size Ns
}Nd zeros
(1 ≤ i ≤ Ns) (20)
are right eigenvectors of EsD
−1A that respect the orthogonality v(i)u(j) = δij , where δ is the Kronecker
delta.
For completeness, I obtain the expression of the other Nd right eigenvectors of EsD
−1A corresponding
to the trivial zero eigenvalue as follows. I align v(i) and u(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns) such that nonzero eigenvectors
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correspond to 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns − N0 and generalized zero eigenmodes correspond to Ns − N0 + 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns.
Then, the orthogonality condition v(i)u(j) = δij reads


v
(1)
s
v
(1)
s D
−1
s Asd
λ1
...
...
v
(Ns−N0)
s
v
(Ns−N0)
s D
−1
s Asd
λNs−N0
v
(Ns−N0+1)
s
... 0
v
(Ns)
s
0 INd



u
(1)
s u
(2)
s · · ·u
(Ns)
s M
0 INd

 = I (21)
for an Ns-by-Nd matrix M . Equation (21) yields
M = −
(
u
(1)
s · · · u
(Ns−N0)
s
)


v
(1)
s D
−1
s Asd
λ1
...
v
(Ns−N0)
s D
−1
s Asd
λNs−N0


. (22)
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Finally, the decomposition of EsD
−1A is given by
EsD
−1A
=

u
(1)
s u
(2)
s · · ·u
(Ns)
s M
0 INd




λ1v
(1)
s v
(1)
s D−1s Asd
...
...
λNs−N0v
(Ns−N0)
s v
(Ns−N0)
s D−1s Asd
v
(Ns−N0+1)
s D−1s Asd
0
...
v
(Ns)
s D−1s Asd
0 0


=
Ns−N0∑
j=1
λj

u
(j)
s
0


(
v
(j)
s
v
(j)
s D
−1
s Asd
λj
)
+
Ns∑
j=Ns−N0+1

u
(j)
s
0


(
0 v
(j)
s D−1s Asd
)
. (23)
Combining Eq. (23) and the orthogonality condition v
(i)
s u
(j)
s = δij , I obtain
[
EsD
−1A
]ℓ
=
Ns−N0∑
j=1
λℓj

u
(j)
s
0


(
v
(j)
s
v
(j)
s D
−1
s Asd
λj
)
(ℓ ≥ 2). (24)
Using Eqs. (16), (23), and (24), we can express the quantities appearing on the left-hand sides of
17
Eqs. (9) and (11) as
[
I − w(I − Ei)D
−1A
]−1
=I +
Ns−N0∑
j=1
wλj
1− wλj

u
(j)
s
0


(
v
(j)
s
v
(j)
s D
−1
s Asd
λj
)
+ w
Ns∑
j=Ns−N0+1

u
(j)
s
0


(
0 v
(j)
s D−1s Asd
)
, (25)
(I − Ei)D
−1A
[
I − w(I − Ei)D
−1A
]−1
=
Ns−N0∑
j=1
λj
1− wλj

u
(j)
s
0


(
v
(j)
s
v
(j)
s D
−1
s Asd
λj
)
+
Ns∑
j=Ns−N0+1

u
(j)
s
0


(
0 v
(j)
s D−1s Asd
)
. (26)
If Ass is symmetric, D
−1/2
s AssD
−1/2
s is also symmetric and therefore diagonalizable by a unitary ma-
trix. Denote the eigenvalue and the right eigenvector of D
−1/2
s AssD
−1/2
s by λˆi and uˆ
(i), respectively.
Note that λˆi and uˆ
(i) are both real and can be computed relatively easily. Then, we can obtain the re-
lationships λi = λˆi, u
(i)
s = D
−1/2
s uˆ
(i), and v
(i)
s = uˆ(i)⊤D
1/2
s . We can also obtain vd = uˆ
(i)⊤D
−1/2
s Asr/λi
when λi 6= 0.
Example network yielding nontrivial zero eigenmodes
Consider the undirected network having N = 3 nodes as shown in Fig. 5. For this network I obtain
D−1A =


0 0 1
0 0 1
1
2
1
2 0

 . (27)
By turning player 3 from GC to CD, I obtain
(I − E3)D
−1A = (E1 + E2)D
−1A =


0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0

 . (28)
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All of the eigenvalues of matrix (28) are equal to zero, one trivial and two nontrivial. The one trivial zero
eigenvalue originates from removing player 3 from the network of GCs. The trivial zero left eigenvector
is given by v3 = e
⊤
3 = (0 0 1). I select the two generalized zero left eigenmodes to be vi = e
⊤
i (i = 1, 2).
The choice of v1 and v2 is not unique. The right eigenmodes are given by ui = ei(1 ≤ i ≤ 3).
Equation (19), for example, then reads v1(E1 + E2)D
−1A = v2(E1 + E2)D
−1A = v3 and v3(E1 +
E2)D
−1A = 0.
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Figure 1. Directed cycle with N = 3 nodes.
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Figure 2. Relationship between threshold discount factor (wth) and cost-to-benefit ratio
(c/b). I use the five types of networks and set (a) N = 20, k = 4, and (b) N = 200, k = 6. The results
for direct reciprocity (i.e., wth = c/b) and upstream reciprocity on the directed triangle (i.e.,
wth =
√
c/b) are also shown by thin black lines for comparison. In (a), I set the rewiring probability for
the WS model to p = 0 and p = 0.1. For the BA model, there are initially m0 = 2 nodes (i.e., dyad),
and the number of links that each added node has is set to m = 2. For my variant of the KE model, the
initial number of nodes and the number of links that each added node has are set to m = 2, and an
active node i is deactivated with probability proportional to (ki + a)
−1, where a = 2. After constructing
the network based on the original KE model [34], I rewire fraction p = 0.1 of randomly selected links to
make the average distance small. In (b), I set p = 0 and p = 0.05 for the WS model, m0 = m = 3 for
the BA model, and m = a = 3 and p = 0.05 for the KE model.
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Figure 3. Effects of network size (N). (a) Dependence of the threshold discount factor (wth) on N .
(b) Dependence of the clustering coefficient (C) on N . I use the five types of networks and set
c/b = 1/3. The parameter values for the networks are the same as those used in Fig. 2(b). In (a), the
results for the BA and KE models heavily overlap.
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Figure 4. Relationship between threshold discount factor (wth(i)) and node degree (ki). I
use the RRG, the BA model, and the KE model with N = 200 and k = 6, and set c/b = 1/3. The
parameter values for the networks are the same as those used in Fig. 2(b).
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Figure 5. A network yielding nontrivial zero eigenvalues.
